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In spite of a labor reform introduced in 1990 as part of a reform package
that liberalized the economy in many dimensions,1 Colombia’s urban un-
employment reached an unprecedented 20 percent by the end of that de-
cade. The 1990 reform made labor contracts more ﬂexible, including a re-
duction in job security provisions. The most signiﬁcant change took placein
relation to severance payments, with the introduction of a system of indi-
vidual accounts managed by specialized private funds. Under the old sys-
tem, employers managed the funds, and employees were allowed to make
partial withdrawals at any time. At the time of separation, those withdrawals
were debited in nominal terms, adding to the costs faced by employers. In
practice, the new system implied a reduction in the level and uncertainty of
severance payments for ﬁrms. In fact, the initial eﬀect of the reform was to
lower nonwage labor costs to 42.9 percent of the basic wage, down from 
47.1 percent during the late 1980s. However, the reform did not deal with
other important areas of labor legislation, especially payroll taxation.2
229
4
Determinants of Labor Demand
in Colombia
1976–1996
Mauricio Cárdenas and Raquel Bernal
Mauricio Cárdenas is executive director of Fedesarrollo in Bogotá, Colombia. Raquel
Bernal is assistant professor of economics at Northwestern University.
This chapter was mostly written while the authors were aﬃliated with Fedesarrollo in Bo-
gotá, Colombia. We are grateful to Daniel Hamermesh, Carmen Pagés, and Juan Mauricio
Ramírez for comments and suggestions, and to Jairo Augusto Núñez for his valuable help in
processing the data for this project.
1. The reforms of the early 1990s were introduced mainly as a result of low growth during
the 1980s, combined with an election turnout that gave President César Gaviria, a convinced
reformist, a signiﬁcant majority in congress.
2. The reform kept a 9 percent payroll tax earmarked for labor training by SENA (2 per-
cent), social welfare programs for the unprotected childhood by ICBF (3 percent), and fam-
ily subsidies provided by the privately managed Cajas (4 percent).The reform package also included a social security law, enacted in 1993,
which raised employers’ mandatory contributions for health and pension
programs. From the viewpoint of the labor market, this reform had impor-
tant implications resulting from the signiﬁcant increase in nonwage labor
costs. In fact, by 1996 nonwage labor costs had risen to 52 percent of the
basic salary, an increase of nearly 10 percentage points relative to their
level in 1991.
This chapter analyzes the combined eﬀect of these two reforms on labor
demand.3The results indicate that the increase in labor costs resulting from
the pension and health reform had a negative impact on labor demand.
Thus, the chapter calls for a new generation of labor market reform in
Colombia, aimed at reducing nonwage labor costs.
The chapter is structured in the following way. Section 4.2 discusses the
institutional and regulatory framework governing the labor market, with
special attention to the changes introduced in the 1990 and 1993 reforms.
Particular emphasis is placed on measuring the nonwage costs implied by
the regulation. Section 4.3 shows the main stylized facts in the labor mar-
ket between 1976 and 1996. Section 4.4 deals with the incidence of payroll
taxation on wages in a framework that analyzes the possible endogeneity of
wage and nonwage labor costs. More speciﬁcally, the section tests whether
higher nonwage costs faced by employers have been transferred to workers
in the form of lower basic wages. The results suggest that ﬁrms do not lower
wages when facing higher nonwage labor costs resulting from the legisla-
tion. The chapter then moves to the analysis of labor demand. Section 4.5
estimates standard labor demand equations with the time series data. The
emphasis of the estimation is placed on the measurement of the own-wage
elasticities, as well as the elasticities of substitution between diﬀerent fac-
tors of production. It also tests for possible changes in the value of those
elasticities, associated with the reform package of the early 1990s.4 Section
4.6 presents the results of estimating the determinants of labor demand in
a dynamic framework that considers explicitly the impact of the regula-
tions on the path of employment adjustment. Sections 4.7 and 4.8 present
the results of labor demand estimations based on panels of manufacturing
establishments and sectors, respectively. Section 4.9 concludes.
The main conclusions of the chapter are the following. First, labor de-
mand elasticities in Colombia are around –0.5, a value that is not low5 (in
absolute terms) by international standards. Ceteris paribus, the increase in
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3. Kugler (chap. 3 in this volume) analyzes the eﬀects of changes in job security provisions,
such as severance payments and other dismissal costs, on labor turnover.
4. Trade liberalization was an essential part of the package. As is well known, trade liber-
alization can make labor demand more elastic by making output markets more competitive
and by making domestic labor more substitutable with foreign factors. Or in the words of
Hicks (1963, 242), “the demand for anything is likely to be more elastic, the more elastic is de-
mand for any further thing which it contributes to produce.”
5. This is assuming that all the increase in taxes and contributions implied an increase in la-
bor costs.labor costs, has resulted in a signiﬁcant reduction in labor demand. The
message is that the payoﬀ, in terms of greater employment, of a reduction
in payroll taxes is considerable. Second, adjustment costs of changing
employment as well as wage elasticities were not aﬀected by changes in
the regulations regarding severance payments and dismissal costs. In this
sense, structural reforms did have an impact on labor demand through its
eﬀect on relative prices alone. Finally, we conclude that the wage elasticity
of labor demand increases (in absolute terms) during contractions. Hence,
the increase in prices and the beginning of a recession had a signiﬁcant
eﬀect on employment.
4.2 Labor Legislation: Recent Changes
As mentioned in the introduction, the regulation of the labor market in
Colombia saw important changes during the 1990s. This section summa-
rizes key aspects of the 1990 labor reform and the reform to the social se-
curity system that was enacted in 1993.6
• Severance pay was the highest nonwage labor cost under the pre-1990
regime. Employees were entitled to one-month salary per year of work
(based on the last salary). Partial withdrawals were allowed and de-
ducted in nominal terms from the ﬁnal payment, implying a form of
“double retroactivity” (with an estimated cost of 4.2 percent of the to-
tal wage bill).7 The new legislation eliminated this extra cost in all new
labor contracts and introduced a monthly contribution (9.3 percent of
the basic salary) to a capitalized fund in the workers’ name, accessible
in the event of separation or retirement. Thus, the reform eﬀectively
reduced the level and uncertainty of the costs associated with sever-
ance payments.
• The reform increased the indemnity paid to workers dismissed with-
out just cause. Workers with less than one year of tenure on the job
receive forty-ﬁve days’ wages. Workers with more than one year of
tenure receive forty-ﬁve days’ wages for the ﬁrst year plus an addi-
tional amount for each extra year, which implied an increase relative
to the old regime. For example, in the event of separation, a worker
with more than ten years of tenure on the job used to receive thirty
days’ wages for each extra year (after the ﬁrst). As can be seen in table
4B.1, the new legislation increased the indemnity to the equivalent of
forty days’ wages per additional year.8Although the legal deﬁnition of
just cause was widened, the reform increased the costs of dismissal.
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6. See Lora and Henao (1995), Cárdenas and Gutiérrez (1996), Lora and Pagés (1997), and
Guash (1997).
7. Apart from tenure, the real cost of termination of employment increased with the fre-
quency of partial withdrawals, uncertain to the employer.
8. Based on the highest salary during the last year of employment.• However, the right of workers with more than ten years tenure to sue
for reinstatement was eliminated. Prior to the reform, successful plain-
tiﬀs could oblige ﬁrms to rehire workers with back pay.
• Workers earning more than ten minimum wages were allowed to opt
for a new contract (“integral salaries”) with higher wages instead of
severance pay and other mandatory beneﬁts (such as the especial
bonus or prima). However, in a survey conducted by Fedesarrollo in
1994, manufacturing ﬁrms reported that less than 2 percent of the em-
ployees had this type of contract.
• Labor contracts for less than one year were allowed (renewable up to
three times under the same terms),9 provided that all beneﬁts are paid
in proportion to the duration of the contract.
• Legal restrictions on the creation of labor unions were lifted. In par-
ticular, the Ministry of Labor lost discretionary powers in this regard.
Also, it became unlawful for employers to discourage the creation of
labor unions. A minimum of twenty-ﬁve workers is still necessary to
form a union.
• The 1993 social security and health reform (Law 100) increased total
contributions for health from 7 percent of the basic salary (until 1994)
to 8 percent in 1995 and 12 percent afterwards. One-third of the total
contribution has to be paid by the employer (the same proportion as
in the old system).
• The same law increased pension contributions to 13.5 percent in 1996
(14.5 percent for workers that earn more than four minimum wages)
from 8 percent of the basic salary in 1993. The increase was imple-
mented gradually. Contributions were ﬁrst raised to 11.5 percent in
April 1994 and then to 12.5 percent in 1995. Employers currently pay
10.1 percentage points of the total contribution, as opposed to 4.3 be-
fore the reform.10
Figure 4.1 summarizes the eﬀects of labor and social security reform on
nonwage labor costs. Total nonwage labor costs paid by the ﬁrm (as a per-
centage of the basic salary) rose to 52 percent after the 1993 pension re-
form from 42.9 percent after the 1990 labor reform. For the purpose of the
analysis, we divide nonwage costs into three relatively arbitrary categories:
(1) deferred wages, which include vacations, extra bonuses, pension, and
health contributions. In theory, deferred wages aﬀect the total labor cost
but do not have an impact on the path of employment adjustment; (2) sev-
erance payments, which, in addition to the direct impact on labor costs,
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9. The fourth renovation has to be made for at least one year. See Farné and Nupia (1996).
10. Law 100 (1993) eliminated the monopoly of the Social Security Institute (ISS) in the
provision of health and pensions. The coverage of health services was extended to the whole
family and to low-income groups that were unattended under the previous system. In relation
to the pension system, employees were given the option of choosing between the old pay-as-
you-go system or the new fully funded system provided by private pension funds.Fig. 4.1 Nonwage labor costs (as a percentage of wage)
Source: Ocampo (1987) before 1990 and Regulation Manuals.aﬀect the dynamics of employment adjustment;11and (3) payroll taxes that
fund programs with beneﬁts that cannot be fully internalized by the em-
ployee (e.g., Instituto Colombiano de Bienestar Familiar (ICBF), Servicio
National de Aprendizaje (SENA), and Cajas de Compensacion Familiar
(Cajas)).12 The economic response to these three types of nonwage costs
may be diﬀerent. In the case of deferred wages, the employer can oﬀset part
of the cost by adjusting the wage. This may not be the case of payroll taxes
earmarked for the provision of public goods. In the fourth section we ana-
lyze the possible eﬀect of deferred wages on current wages by estimating a
Mincer-type income equation. The hypothesis is that the employer may
transfer nonwage costs to workers through lower wages.
The upper panel of ﬁgure 4.1 shows the evolution of severance pay-
ments, as well as health and pension contributions for an average worker,
as a percentage of the basic wage between 1976 and 1996.13 The middle
panel shows the evolution of payroll taxes. These taxes increased by 1 per-
centage point in 1982 (earmarked to SENA) and again by an equal amount
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11. Strictly speaking, severance payments are also deferred wages.
12. Of course, if the linkage between payroll taxes is weak or if the external beneﬁts of so-
cial security programs are signiﬁcant, then partial or complete ﬁnance by general revenues
may be appropriate. See Kesselman (1995).
13. Workers under “integral salaries” are excluded. After 1991 we ignore workers under
pre-1990 contractual terms.
Fig. 4.1 (cont.) Nonwage labor costs (as a percentage of wage) 
Source: Ocampo (1987) before 1990 and Regulation Manuals.in 1989 (earmarked for ICBF). Vacations and extra bonuses have remained
constant throughout the period. The bottom panel adds all these costs to-
gether. The cumulative eﬀect shows an increasing trend until 1990. After
the 1990 labor reform, nonwage labor costs fell as a result of the changes
introduced to the legislation related to severance payments. However, since
1994 these costs have increased sharply as a result of the 1993 health and
pension reforms.
4.3 Stylized Facts
Figure 4.2 displays the unemployment rate for the period 1976–1998.
After reaching a peak in March 1986 (14.6 percent), unemployment rates
declined steadily until 1994 when they were under 8 percent. Unemploy-
ment rates have increased sharply since 1995. The ﬁgure for September
2000 (20.5 percent) is the highest in the modern Colombian economic his-
tory. Although much of the explanation of greater unemployment is re-
lated to signiﬁcant increases in labor supply, this chapter argues that labor
demand cannot be ignored. In fact, the increase in the cost of labor—com-
bined with a relatively high own-wage elasticity—had a negative impact on
labor demand. However, this is not the only explanation. The 1990 labor
reform has also caused greater employment volatility in response to econ-
omywide shocks. This has been the result of greater ﬂexibility in the cre-
ation and destruction of jobs. Kugler (chap. 3 in this volume) addresses this
issue in detail.
This chapter uses mainly data on output, employment (skilled and un-
skilled), and wages for Colombia’s seven largest cities. These variables are
available for seven sectors: (1) manufacturing; (2) electricity and gas; (3)
construction; (4) retail, restaurants, and hotels; (5) transportation and
communications; (6) ﬁnancial services; and (7) personal and governmen-
tal services. The data come from the quarterly National Household Survey
(NHS), which has been conducted without interruption since 1976. Out-
put data come from the quarterly gross domestic product (GDP) series
processed by Department of National Planning (DNP).
4.3.1 Employment and Production
Table 4.1displays some basic descriptive statistics on urban employment
for the period 1976–1996. Manufacturing and personal and governmental
services provide 29 percent and 25 percent of the urban jobs, respectively.
We use information only for wage earners, which account for 64 percent of
the total urban workers (62 percent before the 1990 labor reform). How-
ever, there are sharp diﬀerences across sectors. In manufacturing, 76 per-
cent of the workers earn a monetary wage, whereas in retail and restau-
rants only 50 percent of the workers do.
We use a measure of skill that includes high school graduates plus all of





































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































.those with some tertiary education (all workers with twelve or more years
of schooling). By using this deﬁnition, the group of more educated work-
ers represented 23 percent of urban employment, on average, between
1992 and 1996. According to ﬁgure 4.3, this group’s share in total urban
employment has increased steadily since 1976, reﬂecting the greater edu-
cational attainment of the population. Indeed, average years of schooling
have increased continuously during the past two decades. As can be seen in
table 4.1, skilled workers represent more than 30 percent of total employ-
ment in public utilities, ﬁnancial services, and personal and governmental
services. These shares have increased signiﬁcantly since 1992.
Figure 4.4 describes the evolution of employment and production in the
Colombian urban sector. It is interesting to note that after 1991 skilled em-
ployment has grown faster than unskilled employment in most sectors.
This has been particularly true in the case of manufacturing, where em-
ployment of unskilled workers has fallen in absolute terms since 1993. The
same trend is observed in the construction sector after 1994. These two sec-
tors combined employ approximately 35 percent of the unskilled wage
earners in the urban regions.
4.3.2 Factor Prices
Information about labor income received by wage earners (skilled and
unskilled) comes from the NHS. Given that this is not necessarily equal to
the total labor cost paid by the employer (which is the relevant price in the
estimation of labor demand), it is then necessary to quantify nonwage la-
bor costs and construct a measure of the total labor cost. We do that by us-
ing the information contained in ﬁgure 4.1, which summarizes all nonwage
labor costs, expressed as a percentage of the basic salary. This includes sev-
erance payments, payroll taxes, and contributions for health and pensions
on the part of the employer.
It is not entirely clear whether income reported by the individuals sur-
veyed in the NHS includes beneﬁts such as vacations, mandatory bonuses,
and severance payments. Nonetheless, it is probably safe to assume that
individuals report their basic pretax salary, without beneﬁts. In order to
obtain the total labor cost we add all the nonwage labor costs measured in
ﬁgure 4.1 to the basic salary reported in the NHS. Implicitly, this means
assuming the independence of wage and nonwage costs. We do this based
on the results of the next section, which support the idea that employees do
not transfer higher nonwage costs imposed by the legislation through
lower basic salaries. Finally, the overall cost is then deﬂated using the pro-
ducer price index. The procedure is identical for skilled and unskilled work-
ers.14 For completeness, we also report the user cost of capital measured
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14. As mentioned in section 4.2, workers with high remuneration (over ten minimum wages)
under integral salaries contracts have much lower nonwage costs (33.8 percent of the basic
salary versus 52 percent in contracts with full beneﬁts). However, the NHS survey does not


















































































.Fig. 4.4 Colombia: Urban employment and production
Source: NHS.Fig. 4.4 (cont.)Fig. 4.4 (cont.) Colombia: Urban employment and production
Source: NHS.Fig. 4.4 (cont.)according to a standard methodology described in Cárdenas and Gutiér-
rez (1996).15
Figure 4.5 shows the evolution of real factor costs by sector. There are
three key insights for the 1990s: (1) the cost of labor increased signiﬁcantly;
(2) the cost of labor increased faster than the cost of capital; and (3) the
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15. Our measure of the user cost of capital is higher than the one obtained by Pombo (1997),
who estimates the depreciation rates (and the corresponding tax deductions) for diﬀerent as-
set types in the manufacturing sector.
Fig. 4.5 Colombia: Real factor costs in the urban sector
Source: NHS.cost of skilled relative to unskilled labor rose during this period. In fact, the
user cost of capital decreased considerably during the period 1992–1994 as
a result of the reduction in the interest rate and the real currency appreci-
ation. As shown in table 4.2, the average annual growth in real labor costs
between 1992 and 1996 was 11.4 percent for skilled workers and 8.4 per-
cent for unskilled workers. These rates are substantially higher than the
average for the prereform period. In sum, labor costs increased in an un-
precedented way after 1990, especially in the case of skilled workers.
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Fig. 4.5 (cont.)4.4 Endogeneity of Wage and Nonwage Costs
As mentioned previously, we need to support our assumption that wage
and nonwage costs can be added together, ignoring the incidence of pay-
roll taxation on wages. Several authors have warned against this assump-
tion, arguing that wages and nonwage costs are endogenously determined.
This is the case in Newell and Symons (1987) for the European context and
in Gruber (1995) for Chile. Their view is that ignoring this issue can be mis-
leading when making policy recommendations.
246 Mauricio Cárdenas and Raquel Bernal
Fig. 4.5 (cont.)There are diﬀerent ways to deal with this potential endogeneity. Some
authors estimate an equation of the wage rate as a function of the payroll
tax rate and a constant. If the coeﬃcient on the payroll tax rate variable is
equal to –1, then they conclude that taxes are fully shifted into wages. This
is the procedure used by Gruber (1995).
Here we adopt a somewhat diﬀerent procedure. We estimate the deter-
minants of wages based on information from the NHS. Every two years (in
June) the NHS includes a special module on informality where workers re-
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Fig. 4.5 (cont.)port whether they are covered by the social security system. We use the data
from the June 1988, 1992, and 1996 surveys (including the special module)
to estimate a Mincer-type income equation. The regressions are based on
data for each one of the surveyed workers and allow us to understand whether
an individual’s wage, given certain personal characteristics, is negatively
aﬀected when the individual contributes to the social security system.16
Our assumption is that if employers transfer the nonwage labor cost to
employees, then workers that are registered in the social security system
would have lower wages (after controlling for other personal characteris-
tics that may aﬀect wages) than those that are not registered in the social
security system.17 In particular, we estimated the following equation:
(1) ln wt    0  ∑
i
 ipers    5dumss    6mw    7dumss   mw 
 ∑
i
 isec  ∑
i
 icity   εt,
where wt is wage at time t, pers is a vector of personal characteristics that
include average years of schooling, gender, and experience; dumss is a
dummy variable which takes a unitary value when the individual is regis-
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Table 4.2 Annual Average Growth in Total Real Labor Cost (%)
Sector 1977–1985 1986–1991 1992–1996 1977–1996
Unskilled Employment (less than 12 years of education)
Manufacturing 1.80 –1.45 8.09 2.40
Electricity and gas 1.73 –0.20 10.93 3.45
Construction 3.03 –1.16 9.89 3.49
Retail, restaurants, and hotels 2.03 –1.08 8.08 2.61
Transportation and communications 2.23 –0.97 8.28 2.78
Financial services 1.11 –1.84 7.49 1.82
Personal and government services 1.58 –1.38 8.85 2.51
Total urban 1.65 –1.34 8.36 2.43
Skilled Employment (12 years of education or more)
Manufacturing –1.96 –2.78 11.85 1.25
Electricity and gas 3.58 –2.34 15.58 4.81
Construction –0.32 0.55 13.41 3.37
Retail, restaurants, and hotels –1.68 –0.59 10.04 1.58
Transportation and communications 0.73 –0.11 10.79 3.00
Financial services –1.38 –0.56 12.83 2.42
Personal and government services –1.14 –1.61 11.81 1.95
Total urban –1.63 –1.71 11.36 1.59
Source: NHS.
16. The percentage of workers with health coverage rose to 60 percent in 1996 from 50 per-
cent in 1988.
17. Ribero and Meza (1997) and Sánchez and Núñez (1998) have estimated Mincer-type in-
come equations for Colombia.tered in the social security system (i.e., the employer pays social security
contributions); mw is a dummy variable that controls for individuals that
earn the minimum wage18 (payroll taxes cannot be transferred to these
workers in the form of lower wages); secis a vector of dummy variables that
account for 9 economic sectors and city is a vector of dummy variables for
each of the 7 main cities.
Table 4.3presents the results of estimating equation (1). The adjustment
of the regression is high (R-squares are around 0.55) given the total num-
ber of observations (approximately 25,000 depending on the year). The
personal characteristics variables appear with the correct sign and are sta-
tistically signiﬁcant. In particular, returns to education are positive (but
low) and the coeﬃcient is highly signiﬁcant. The positive coeﬃcient of the
dummy variable for gender indicates that given other personal character-
istics, labor income is relatively higher for men. In turn, experience has a
positive but decreasing impact on wages. According to the sign of the co-
eﬃcient, individuals that earn the minimum wage have lower incomes than
what would be predicted by their personal characteristics. The dummy
variables that account for the economic sectors and the city of location also
come out signiﬁcant.
Turning to the variables of interest for this exercise, for a given set of per-
sonal characteristics, workers covered by the social security system have
higher wages than uncovered workers. This is of interest because it suggests
that employers might not transfer social security contributions to workers
in the form of lower wages. However, it is possible that social security con-
tributions are proxying for self-selection and unobserved characteristics of
the workers, biasing the results. Thus, it is unclear whether the results of
this section provide the necessary support in order to use our measure—
total labor costs, which is simply the sum of wage and nonwage costs (self-
selection may be hiding the true eﬀect of endogeneity bias). We take a prag-
matic approach and estimate the labor demand equations with only wages
and compare the results with regressions that include both wages and non-
wage costs added together.
4.5 Static Labor Demand
The purpose of this section is to measure the own-wage elasticities of the
demand for labor, as well as the elasticities of substitution between diﬀer-
ent factors of production.19 The literature is rich in terms of functional
forms that can be used for the estimation. If changes in the elasticity of
substitution are of interest, the generalized Leontief (GL) function is a
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18. For the purpose of this exercise, the minimum wage in 1988 (in Colombian pesos) was
$28,000, in 1992 it was $72,000, and in 1996 it was $155,000.
19. The elasticities of substitution between diﬀerent factors of production is deﬁned as the
eﬀect of a change in relative factor prices on relative input use of the two factors, holding out-
put and other factor prices constant.Table 4.3 Mincer Income Equation
Log (Wages) 1988 1992 1996
Constant 10.0354 11.2707 12.0258
(576.90) (624.09) (670.16)
Education 0.044 0.0182 0.0181
(52.01) (30.54) (31.91)
Gender 0.1671 0.1688 0.1585
(23.45) (22.11) (20.18)
Experience 0.019 0.0185 0.0172
(24.37) (21.57) (20.36)
Experience2 –0.0002 –0.0003 –0.0002
(–20.53) (–21.43) (–18.80)
Dummy health coverage 0.0628 0.1421 0.1838
(6.84) (13.93) (18.63)
Health coverage   minimum wage 0.2848 0.2342 0.1320
(20.48) (15.52) (8.31)
Minimum wage –1.0045 –1.1018 –1.0907
(–107.65) (–106.29) (–99.55)
Agriculture 0.1267 0.1114 0.4358
(5.08) (3.73) (1.28)
Mining 0.1865 0.4505 0.2378
(4.13) (3.73) (3.90)
Electricity 0.0547 0.0398 0.1868
(1.45) (0.92) (4.32)
Construction 0.0874 0.0602 0.0733
(5.73) (3.64) (4.48)
Retail –0.0095 0.0367 0.0449
(–1.02) (3.61) (4.20)
Communications 0.0463 0.0751 0.0742
(3.14) (4.65) (4.66)
Financial services 0.0951 0.1564 0.1545
(6.28) (9.78) (9.85)
Government services –0.0003 –0.0009 0.0413
(–0.00) (–0.09) (2.38)
Other services –0.1665 0.1180 0.4188
(–0.43) (0.70) (2.38)
Barranquilla –0.0083 0.0193 0.0374
(–0.77) (1.72) (3.17)
Bucaramanga 0.0065 –0.0504 –0.0662
(0.55) (–4.05) (–5.23)
Manizales 0.0264 –0.0646 –0.1159
(1.59) (–3.67) (–6.77)
Medellin 0.0594 –0.0256 –0.0018
(6.63) (–2.50) (–0.18)
Cali 0.0508 0.0250 0.0189
(4.77) (2.15) (1.52)
Pasto –0.1405 –0.1943 –0.0781
(–9.22) (–12.38) (–4.87)
No. of observations 29,476 26,900 25,887
R2 0.5504 0.5526 0.5269
Sources: NHS and authors’ calculations.common choice. The GL speciﬁcation is also normally used when infor-
mation is available for more than two factors of production.20
The derived factor demands from a GL cost function (see appendix A)
















   iyt    it,
where xit is the quantity of factor i used in period t, yt is output in period t,
pit is the price of input i in period t, and t is a time trend. Changes in the in-
put-output ratio can be the result of: (1) changes in relative factor prices;
(2) changes in the scale of production (if the production function is not ho-
mothetic); and (3) technological change. Diewert (1971) has shown that
the GL cost function corresponds to a ﬁxed coeﬃcients technology (no
factor substitution) if bij   0 for all i   j. Also, the production function ex-
hibits constant returns to scale if  i   0 for all i (i.e., the function is homo-
thetic). Clearly, factor-augmenting technological change does not occur if
 i   0 for all i. Based on the estimated bij, we then calculate the own-wage
elasticity for factor i ( it) as
(3)  ij    .
In turn, the Hicks-Allen partial elasticities of substitution between input i
and input j (  ij    ji) can be easily calculated. The appropriate expressions
in the case of the GL technology are (sj is the cost share of input j)
(4)   ij   ,
for all i   j. In this case, the elasticity of substitution is not constant across
time. In fact, as can be observed in equation (4), its value depends on the
inputs quantities and prices. Finally, the elasticity of input iwith respect to
output is given by







Thus, when the technology exhibits constant returns to scale the output
elasticity is equal to one.
4.5.1 Results
This section summarizes the main results of the estimation of static la-
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20. See Hamermesh (1986).is ﬁrst carried out with data for the manufacturing sector alone, based on
a system of two equations for the demand of skilled and unskilled labor.
The equations use the number of hours worked as the dependent variable.
We then turn to the data for the seven largest metropolitan cities, using a
similar framework but dropping capital as a factor of production. In both
cases we deal with speciﬁcations that use relative input prices (skilled and
unskilled labor), so the eﬀects of nonwage labor costs vanish (percentage-
wise, their impact is identical for each type of labor).
4.5.2 Manufacturing
Table 4.4 presents the results on the factor demands for skilled and un-
skilled labor.21 According to the GL speciﬁcation, the system of two equa-
tions describing the behavior of the input-output ratios was estimated us-
ing a (Gauss) Full Information Maximum Likelihood procedure (FIML).
In order to correct for ﬁrst-order serial autocorrelation of the error, the
lagged residuals were added to each equation (AR1).
The system was estimated with and without the symmetry restrictions (bij
  bji). Conveniently, Theil has shown that minus twice the log of the likeli-
hood ratio (i.e., the maximum of the likelihood function imposing symme-
try over the maximum of the likelihood function in the unconstrained case)
has a chi-square ( 2) distribution (with degrees of freedom equal to the
number of restrictions imposed).22 The test rejected the null hypothesis of
symmetry. Also, in the estimations the coeﬃcient  i came out not signiﬁ-
cantly diﬀerent from zero, rejecting the hypothesis of factor-augmenting
technological progress.
The estimated bij (excluding the trend term from the equations) are sig-
niﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero, rejecting the existence of a ﬁxed proportion
technology (a Leontief production function). Importantly, the signs of the
coeﬃcients indicate that the two types of labor are substitutes. The hy-
pothesis of constant returns to scale is also rejected at high levels of signif-
icance. The estimated  i coeﬃcients are all positive and signiﬁcant. This
implies that both employment and output ratios increase as the scale of
production is expanded (i.e., the production function is nonhomothetic).
Based on the estimated bij we then compute the relevant elasticities that,
according to the formulae, are time dependent. We report the elasticities
for four periods: 1976–1981, 1982–1985, 1986–1991, and 1992–1996. The
two types of labor show a decreasing degree of substitutability. Own-wage
elasticities are negative.23 For the 1992–1996 period their value is around
–0.35 for skilled workers and –0.4 for unskilled workers. This means that a
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21. In this case, we are using total labor costs as the relevant price, that is, salary plus non-
wage costs.
22. See López (1980).
23. The change in the wage elasticities over the four periods of time considered here is sta-
tistically signiﬁcant at 95 percent conﬁdence level.10 percent reduction in wages is related to a 3.5 percent increase in the de-
mand skilled and a 4 percent increase in the demand for unskilled labor.24
Output elasticities are positive during the whole period but seem to have
decreased with time. In particular a 1 percent increase in production is re-
lated to a 2 percent increase in skilled labor demand and a 1 percent in-
crease in unskilled labor demand.25
4.5.3 Seven Metropolitan Areas
Table 4.5 shows the results of the estimation in the case of the demand
for hours worked by skilled and unskilled labor (without capital) in the
seven largest metropolitan areas.26 Besides changes in relative prices, we
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Table 4.4 Factor Demands for Skilled and Unskilled Labor in the Manufacturing
Sector: GL Speciﬁcation (1977:1–1996:4)
Employment Constant Relative Prices Production R2 D.W.
Skilled –0.7736∗∗∗ 0.7984∗∗∗ 1.0133∗∗∗ 0.79 2.04
(–3.06) (2.72) (6.38)
Unskilled 1.2058∗∗∗ –0.2495∗∗∗ 0.0670 0.23 1.94
(8.66) (–2.24) (1.15)
Price, Income, and Substitution Elasticities
1976–1981 1982–1985 1986–1991 1992–1996
Own-wage elasticities
 ee –0.593 –0.523 –0.431 –0.350
 oo –0.487 –0.409 –0.390 –0.400
Elasticity of substitution
 eo 3.850 2.876 2.498 1.979
Output elasticities
εey 2.204 2.008 1.986 1.968
εoy 1.050 1.049 1.060 1.068
Sources: NHS and authors’ calculations.
Notes: o   unskilled employment; e   skilled employment; y   production. Employment in
number of hours.
∗∗∗Signiﬁcant at the 1 percent level.
24. The results using a constant elasticity of substitution (CES) function are somewhat
diﬀerent. In this case, a 10 percent decrease in wages is related to a 0.8 percent increase in
skilled labor demand and a 1.7 percent increase in unskilled labor demand, respectively.
Again, the two types of labor show increasing substitutability, just as in the case of capital and
unskilled labor. On the other hand, skilled labor and capital are complements. These results
are available upon request.
25. The results when splitting up into two subsamples (after and before the reform) are sta-
tistically insigniﬁcant.
26. Table 4.5 shows the results in which total labor costs (salary plus nonwage costs) are
used as the relevant price. However the same exercise was performed using wages only, that
is, excluding nonlabor costs. In this case, results are fairly similar.added a demand shifter in the equation. In particular, we introduced the
investment rate for the urban economy into equation (2) in order to as-
sess any possible changes in labor demand, holding constant relative
prices.
Again, the Wald test rejected the null hypothesis so we estimated the bij
without symmetry restrictions. The coeﬃcients turned out signiﬁcantly
diﬀerent from zero, rejecting the existence of a ﬁxed proportion technol-
ogy. The estimated  icoeﬃcient for skilled employment is positive and sig-
niﬁcant. This implies that skilled employment and output ratio increases
as the scale of production is expanded (i.e., the production function is non-
homothetic). Based on the estimated bij we computed the relevant elastici-
ties. The two types of labor show a decreasing degree of substitutability as
can be seen in ﬁgure 4.6. On average, the elasticity of substitution between
skilled and unskilled employment was 0.93 between 1976 and 1996.
Own-wage elasticities are higher in this case than in the manufactur-
ing sector. In particular, a 10 percent decrease in wages is related to a 4.5
percent increase in skilled labor demand and a 5.1 percent increase in
unskilled labor demand.27 In the case of unskilled labor, the own-wage
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Table 4.5 Factor Demands for Skilled and Unskilled Labor in the Seven Largest Metropolitan
Areas: GL Speciﬁcation (1977:1–1996:4)
Employment Constant Relative Prices Production Demand Shifter R2 D.W.
Skilled –0.8864∗∗∗ 0.9243∗∗∗ 0.7152∗∗∗ 0.0882∗∗∗ 0.92 2.24
(–3.41) (3.80) (11.57) (2.68)
Unskilled 1.3739∗∗∗ –0.485∗∗∗ –0.026 0.0665∗∗∗
(8.27) (–3.43) (–0.62) (2.66)
Price, Income, and Substitution Elasticities
1976–1981 1982–1985 1986–1991 1992–1996
Own-wage elasticities
 ee –0.755 –0.642 –0.507 –0.445
 oo –0.573 –0.497 –0.461 –0.515
Elasticity of substitution
 eo 1.147 0.982 0.822 0.798
Output elasticities
εey 1.873 1.772 1.714 1.839
εoy 0.979 0.978 0.975 0.966
Sources: NHS and authors’ calculations.
Notes: o   unskilled employment; e   skilled employment; y   production. Employment in number of
hours.
∗∗∗Signiﬁcant at the 1 percent level.
27. The corresponding own-wage elasticities in the case in which wages (excluding nonwage















































































































.elasticity has increased in absolute value during the postreform period to
0.51 from 0.46 in the prereform period. On the other hand, output elastic-
ities are positive. A one percent increase in output is related to a 1.8 per-
cent increase in skilled labor demand and a one percent increase in un-
skilled labor demand. Higher investment rates increase both skilled and
unskilled labor demand. Yet, this eﬀect has been slightly higher in the case
of skilled employment.
Finally, we estimated equation (1), adding a dummy for the postreform
period (alone and interacted with the relative prices). The coeﬃcients on
these variables did not turn out signiﬁcant. This means that the eﬀects of
the reforms are already captured in the changes in relative prices or in the
demand shifter that was added to the equation. The results (not reported)
on these regressions are available upon request.
4.6 Dynamic Labor Demand
The existence of adjustment costs of changing employment (net
changes) and changes in ﬁring and hiring (gross changes) implies that ﬁrms
do not adjust instantly to changes in the variables mentioned in the previ-
ous section. To capture this issue, we estimated a dynamic labor demand
equation that is derived in appendix B:
(6) nt c   0yt   1yt 1   0(wt nwt)    1(wt 1 nwt 1)    tnt 1 ut,
where nis employment, yis a rolling autoregression forecast of production,
wis a rolling autoregression forecast of basic wages, nw are nonwage labor
costs that do not aﬀect the path of employment adjustment, and u is an er-
ror term. Nonwage labor costs include vacations, bonuses, health and pen-
sion contributions, and payroll taxes (all added as percent of basic wage).
Alternatively, we also estimate equation (6), ignoring nonwage labor costs.
In turn,  t is a measure of the costs of adjustment, which depends on the
regulations that aﬀect the path of employment. Following Burgess and
Dolado (1989), we interact diﬀerent types of regulation with nt–1. In par-
ticular, we assume that
(7)  t    0    1R1t    2R2t,
where R1 denotes severance payments (expressed as a percentage of the
basic salary), and R2 denotes dismissal costs (indemnity for dismissal
without just cause expressed in terms of the number of monthly wages for
workers with ten or more years in the ﬁrm).28 As mentioned in section 4.2,
severance payments fell as a result of the 1990 labor reform, while the in-
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28. This variable is taken as a proxy for dismissal costs for all workers. Although desirable,
we were unable to redeﬁne the dependent variable in order to measure employment of work-
ers with ten or more years in their current job only.demnity for unjust dismissal increased.29 These two changes in the regula-
tion should have had opposite eﬀects on the costs of adjustment. The re-
duction in severance payments should have reduced the costs of adjust-
ment (a reduction in  t), while the increase in dismissal costs should have
worked in the opposite direction. Importantly, the 1993 pension and health
reform increased labor costs but should not have aﬀected the costs of ad-
justment.
This formulation is useful in order to assess the impact of a one-unit in-
crease in the costs of regulations on the level of employment (the  s) and
that of this increase in the cost per worker on the path of employment ad-
justment (the  s). In the former case, we can infer the impact or short-run
multiplier coeﬃcient ( 0) and the long or equilibrium multiplier ( 0    1)/
(1 –  t). Moreover, we can test whether these multipliers changed as a re-
sult of the structural reforms. This can be done as a quasi-natural experi-
ment by including a postreform dummy interacted with wages and the
lagged employment measure.
4.6.1 Econometric Results
Table 4.6 presents the results of the estimation of equation (6) with ag-
gregated quarterly data from the NHS. In order to avoid potential endo-
geneity in the shocking variables, we used rolling-regression (i.e., continu-
ously updated) forecasts of the product demand and wages instead of their
actual values. In the case of output, the forecast is based on fourth-order
autoregression. Wages are forecasted with a third-order autoregression.30
The ﬁrst three columns show the results of estimating (6) for total urban
employment. Unfortunately, we cannot include R1 and R2 in the same re-
gression due to collinearity of the variables. The results are of interest. The
ﬁrst three columns indicate that the product elasticity of employment is
0.57, while the wage elasticity is zero in the short run (impact) but –0.37 in
the long run. The same regression was performed ignoring nonwage costs
(available upon request). The estimated elasticities are practically identical.
The results also suggest that the changes in the regulations did not have an
impact on adjustment costs. In fact, the coeﬃcient on lagged employment
indicates that quarterly changes in employment are, on average, only 40 per-
cent of the desired adjustment, irrespective of the changes in the regulation.
The remaining regressions separate skilled and unskilled employment.
The results suggest that output and price (in absolute value) elasticities are
larger for skilled workers (also in the regression without nonwage costs).
The costs of adjustment were not aﬀected by changes in the regulations re-
garding severance payments and dismissal costs for either type of worker.
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29. However, the elimination of the right to sue for reinstatement with back pay should have
reduced the expected ﬁring costs.





































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































.Moreover, when a postreform dummy was interacted with the wage vari-
ables, the estimated coeﬃcient did not come out signiﬁcant. This result
gives support to the point made in the previous section, suggesting that
structural reform did not aﬀect the price elasticity of labor demand. In this
sense, structural reforms did have an impact on labor demand through its
eﬀect on relative prices alone.31
In sum, the results of this section suggest that regulations add to static
labor costs rather than to the dynamics of employment adjustment. There-
fore, in the next two sections we will revisit the static labor demand esti-
mations, using microdata. Before we move in that direction we present the
results of some simulation exercises based on the dynamic labor demand
estimation. The simulations are illustrative of the eﬀects of diﬀerent
changes that could be introduced to labor legislation.
4.6.2 Simulations
In this section, we perform a simulation exercise in order to assess how
changes in payroll taxes and labor costs aﬀected employment growth in
Colombia. For this purpose, we used equations (3), (4), and (5) in table 4.6
to estimate what would have happened to employment had health and pen-
sions contributions not been increased during the 1993 labor reform.
Figure 4.7 shows the ﬁtted value of employment according to the dy-
namic labor demand speciﬁcations presented in table 4.6. Panel A shows
the results in terms of total employment, while panels B and C report un-
skilled and skilled employment, respectively. As employment is in logs, the
diﬀerence between the two lines represents the percentage change. Ac-
cording to this information, also presented in table 4B.2, during the last
quarter of 1996 total employment would have been 1.3 percent higher if
health and pensions contributions had not changed during 1993. Similarly,
unskilled employment would have been 1.85 percent higher and skilled
employment 2.2 percent higher.
Figure 4.8 depicts the results of a similar exercise. In this case we simu-
late what would have occurred if the 9 percent payroll tax had been elimi-
nated in 1993. In this case, employment would have been 1.3 percent higher
during the last quarter of 1996, compared to what actually happened. The
ﬁgures for unskilled and skilled employment are 1.8 percent and 0.9 per-
cent, respectively.
4.7 Labor Demand in a Panel of Manufacturing Establishments
This section presents some results of the estimation of a homogeneous
labor demand equation with a balanced panel of Colombian manufactur-
ing ﬁrms. The panel was obtained from the Annual Manufacturing Survey
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31. Slaughter (1997) has found that labor demand has been growing less elastic over time in
the United States.A
B
Fig. 4.7 A, Total employment and simulation employment assuming no increases
in health and pensions contributions; B, unskilled employment and simulated un-
skilled employment assuming no increases in health and pensions contributions;
C, skilled employment and simulated skilled employment assuming no increases
in health and pensions contributions
Sources: NHS and authors’ calculations.(EAM) and includes 2,570 ﬁrms throughout the period 1978–1991.32 The
total labor cost was obtained directly for the surveys by adding wages and
other beneﬁts (prestaciones). In the speciﬁcation of the model we follow
Bentolila and Saint-Paul (1992). In particular, we estimate
(8) nit    0    1ni,t 1    2wit    3pit    4kit    5dyit    6t   εit,
where nitis the log total employment by ﬁrm iat time t, witis the log of wage
paid by the ﬁrm (including beneﬁts) deﬂated by the producer price index
(common to all ﬁrms), pit is the log of the price of intermediate goods con-
sumed by the ﬁrm (also deﬂated by the producer price index), kit is the log
of stock of capital, dyit is the growth rate in gross production by the ﬁrm,
and t is a time trend.
The results are reported in table 4.7. The ﬁrst and second columns show
the results of the estimation with least squares and instrumental variables,
respectively. In the latter, we use the lagged values of employment and in-
termediate goods’ prices as instruments (both at time t – 2), as well as the
contemporaneous growth rate in government consumption and the stock
of capital. The results conﬁrm the negative but low value (in absolute
terms) of the short-run wage elasticity of labor demand in the manufac-
turing sector (around –0.05). However, the long-run value of this elasticity
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C
Fig. 4.7 (cont.)
32. The dataset consists of annual observations at the ﬁrm level.is substantially higher in absolute terms (–2.27). The long-run elasticity
with respect to other inputs’ prices is positive (1.36), suggesting labor and
intermediate goods are substitutes in production.
Growth in gross output seems to have a statistically signiﬁcant eﬀect on
employment. Indeed, the results of the estimation indicate that a 1 per-
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A
B
Fig. 4.8 A, Total employment and simulated employment assuming elimination of
9 percent payroll tax; B, skilled employment and simulated skilled employment as-
suming elimination of 9 percent payroll tax; C, unskilled employment and simulated
unskilled employment assuming elimination of 9 percent payroll tax
Sources: NHS and authors’ calculations.centage point increase in the rate of output growth results in a 0.24 per-
centage growth in employment. This result is in line with the time series
evidence of the previous section. In order to correct heteroskedasticity
problems we controlled for ﬁxed eﬀects by adding twenty-eight sectorial
dummy variables to the equation. The results remained virtually un-
changed.
Finally, we interacted the list of regressors with a dummy variable that
captures diﬀerential responses to the business cycle. The dummy variable
takes a unitary value when output growth for the ﬁrm is over 4 percent and
zero when growth is below 2 percent. If the growth rate is between 2 per-
cent and 4 percent, the assigned value at time t depends on growth at t – 1.
The results suggest that the wage elasticity of labor demand decreases (in
absolute terms) during expansions, while the elasticity with respect to the
price of intermediate inputs increases. Thus, an increase in the cost of in-
termediate goods induces greater substitutability vis-à-vis labor during ex-
pansions than during recessions. Lagged employment shows the expected
result, lower inertia in expansion, and the coeﬃcient is highly signiﬁcant.
Last, the results suggest an asymmetric labor demand response to the bus-
iness cycle conditions. The impact of output growth on employment is
larger during recessions than during expansions.
In sum, labor demand elasticities derived from establishment data are
lower (in absolute value) than the ones obtained with aggregate data for the
manufacturing sector. This is true both in the case of own-wage and output
elasticities. The results of this section also indicate that the demand for la-
bor is more elastic in downturns than during expansions. This could ex-
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C
Fig. 4.8 (cont.)plain why unemployment rates rise very rapidly but take a long time to fall,
a pattern that has been found in Colombia.
4.8 Labor Demand in a Panel of Ninety-Two Manufacturing Sectors
This section estimates equation (8) using data from ninety-two indus-
trial sectors (corresponding to the four-digit Clasiﬁcación Industrial In-
ternacional Uniforme [CIIU] classiﬁcation) from 1978 to 1995. In this
case, the log of value added replaces the growth rate in gross production.
Total labor costs (wages plus nonlabor costs) are used as the relevant price
variable.33 The results are presented in table 4.8, where all the variables are
in logs. The ﬁrst column presents the basic equation estimated by ordinary
least squares. The second column corrects ﬁxed eﬀects, and the third col-
umn uses instrumental variables, where lagged values of employment,
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Table 4.7 Labor Demand Estimation Results: Firm Level
Basic Model Interacted with BC
OLS IV OLS   Di IV IV   Di
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Employment (t – 1) 0.964 0.978 0.965 0.987 0.988
(526.20) (492.76) (476.46) (349.27) (331.77)
Labor cost –0.050 –0.051 –0.062 –0.054 –0.070
(–18.19) (–17.76) (–19.08) (–17.86) (–20.13)
Price of materials 0.024 0.030 0.047 0.024 0.051
(3.78) (4.27) (5.15) (2.43) (3.83)
Capital stock 0.025 0.018 0.027 0.015 0.018
(20.99) (14.38) (19.49) (8.60) (9.19)
Growth in production 0.245 0.243 0.242 0.262 0.263
(58.45) (56.22) (56.18) (40.88) (41.02)
Year –0.001 0.000 0.001 0.001
(–2.24) (1.19) (1.91) (2.06)
Employment (t – 1)   BC –0.022 –0.022
(–5.51) (–5.66)
Labor cost   BC 0.003 0.003
(2.06) (1.99)
Price of materials   BC 0.013 0.011
(0.99) (0.85)
Capital stock   BC 0.009 0.009
(3.29) (3.44)
Growth in production   BC –0.063 –0.065
(–6.84) (–7.05)
Adj. R2 0.965 0.966 0.966 0.966 0.966
Notes: Di refers to the 28 sectorial dummies; OLS indicates ordinary least squares; IV indicates instru-
mental variables; and BC is a business cycle dummy described in the text.
33. The same exercise was performed using wages only as the relevant price. Results are vir-



















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































.intermediate goods’ prices (both at time t – 2), and the stock of capital (at
time t– 1) as well as the contemporaneous values of the stock of capital and
wages are the instruments.
The estimated real-wage elasticity is higher (–0.6)34 in absolute terms
than the value estimated with the ﬁrm-level data. Using instrumental vari-
ables (IV), the long-run wage elasticity is –1.43. The elasticity with respect
to input prices is, on average, –1.2, depending on the method of estimation.
Contrary to the ﬁrm-level results, the negative sign suggests that labor and
intermediate goods are complements in production. Value added has a pos-
itive and statistically signiﬁcant eﬀect on employment. According to these
results, a 1 percent increase in value added results in a 0.45 percentage
growth in employment.
Finally, the last three columns in table 4.8 show the results when the ba-
sic equation is interacted with a dummy variable equal to 1 from 1992 to
1995 (and 0 otherwise) in order to assess for possible changes in the coeﬃ-
cients after the implementation of structural reform. The coeﬃcient on
lagged employment indicates that employment has been more ﬂexible since
1992 (lower inertia).
On the other hand, the elasticity with respect to total wage seems to have
decreased (in absolute value) after 1991. Similarly, the response of em-
ployment to changes in value added virtually disappeared during the post-
reform period. The elasticity with respect to material prices turns out to be
positive during the postreform period, indicating that labor and interme-
diate goods are substitutes in production. Interestingly, the positive re-
sponse of employment to the capital stock increased signiﬁcantly after the
new labor regulation was implemented.
4.9 Conclusions
This chapter has analyzed the determinants of the demand for labor in
Colombia’s urban sector (seven largest metropolitan areas) using diﬀerent
sources of data. The main focus of the chapter is to estimate the own-wage
elasticities of labor demand in order to quantify the eﬀects of payroll tax-
ation on employment generation. This is a critical area for policy design,
given the abnormal levels of unemployment that the country is facing.
Some have argued that the relevant elasticities are low, discouraging pol-
icymakers from undertaking major reforms. The common belief is that the
eﬃciency gains associated with labor reform are relatively weak, while the
political costs of changing current labor legislation are very high. This chap-
ter argues that, quite on the contrary, the payoﬀ of reducing labor costs is
substantial.
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34. This elasticity is equal to –0.61 in the case in which nonlabor costs are excluded from la-
bor costs.In order to reach that conclusion, the chapter analyzes the impact of re-
cent changes in the costs of employment and measures their impact on la-
bor demand. The estimated-wage elasticities are summarized in table 4.9.
Using the more reliable quarterly time series obtained from the NHS these
elasticities range from –0.45 to –0.52, depending on the type of labor. How-
ever, the elasticities fall (in absolute terms) when the estimation uses a dy-
namic framework. In this case, the long-run, own-wage elasticity is –0.37.
In the case of the manufacturing sector the elasticities are somewhat
lower. Using the time series data they range between –0.35 (skilled) and 
–0.40 (unskilled). In a panel of ninety-two manufacturing sectors the esti-
mated value is –0.6 (in the short run) and –1.43 (in the long run). These re-
sults change dramatically in a regression that uses establishment data. In
this case the short-run elasticity is only –0.05, although its long-run counter-
part is –2.27.
Output elasticities are larger. In the static labor demand framework the
estimates are close to 2 for skilled workers and 1 for unskilled labor. In the
dynamic speciﬁcation they are 1 for skilled and 0.6 for unskilled employ-
ment. Again, the elasticities fall when panel data is used.
The chapter also analyzes the impact of changes in the regulations on
adjustment costs. The conclusion is that changes in severance payments
and costs of dismissal, associated with the 1990 labor reform, did not aﬀect
the path of employment adjustment. Using this framework, we also con-
clude that structural reforms did not change the relevant elasticities. This
means that the main eﬀect of regulatory changes aﬀected labor demand
through their direct impact on labor costs. Since these costs have increased
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Table 4.9 Labor Demand Elasticities: Summary of Results
Own-Wage Elasticity Output Elasticity
Skilled Unskilled Total Skilled Unskilled Total
Quarterly Time Series (1976:1–1996:4)
–Static labor demand
 Manufacturing –0.350 –0.400 1.968 1.068
 7 metropolitan areas –0.445 –0.515 1.839 0.966
–Dynamic labor demand
 7 Metropolitan areas
Estimated with total labor cost –0.255 n.s. –0.374 1.024 0.604 0.567
Estimated with wages only –0.310 n.s. –0.395 0.999 0.597 0.522
Manufacturing Panel Data (annual)
 2570 establishments (1978–1991) –0.05/–2.27 0.240
 91 sector (1978–1991) –0.60/–1.43 0.440
Sources: NHS and authors’ calculations.
Notes: n.s.   not signiﬁcant. Numbers separated by a solidus indicate short run and long run, respec-
tively.it is likely that the net eﬀect of labor, health, and pension reforms has been
a reduction in employment generation. According to the estimated elastic-
ities in the dynamic framework, an elimination of the 9 percent payroll
taxes could result in a 1.3 percent increase in employment in the urban ar-
eas. Of course, the impact is much greater when the elasticities derived
from the static exercise are used. In this case, a 10 percent reduction in la-
bor costs could result in a 5 percent increase in labor demand.
Using a panel of manufacturing establishments, we also concluded that
the wage elasticity of labor demand increases (in absolute terms) during
contractions. The impact of output growth on employment is also larger
during recessions than during expansions. In this sense, we found an asym-
metric labor demand response to the business cycle conditions. Last, we
did not ﬁnd evidence of a signiﬁcant eﬀect of structural reforms (i.e., trade
liberalization) on the relevant labor demand elasticities. We conclude that
the eﬀects of reforms on labor demand were the result of changes in rela-
tive prices alone.
Appendix A
Generalized Leontief (GL) Cost Function
The GL cost function can be written as





1/2   Q2∑
i
 i pi   Qt∑
i
 ipi,
where Q denotes output and pi is the price of input i (t is time). The func-
tion is homogeneous of degree one in prices and does not impose sym-
metry, concavity, or homotheticity. Assuming price-taking behavior in fac-
tor prices and using Shephard’s Lemma, one can derive cost-minimizing
input demand functions:
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where Xi is the quantity demanded of input i. Factor demands can be ex-
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Analytical Framework for the Dynamic
Labor Demand Estimations
A Cobb-Douglas production function can be written as
(A4) Yt   ALt
 K t
(1  ),
where A denotes a technological parameter, L the level of total employ-
ment, K the capital stock, and   the proportion of employment in produc-
tion.
First-order conditions can be written as






     ALt ∗  1Kt
1  .
Expressing equation (A5) in logarithms, we get
(A6) ln W t   ln  A   (1    )ln Lt ∗   (1    )ln Kt.
Rearranging terms, we get
(A7) ln W t   ln Y t   ln  A   ln A   ln Lt ∗   (1    )ln Lt.
If lowercase letters denote logs, then (A7) is equivalent to








(A9) lt ∗   c    yt    wt.
An adjustment equation satisﬁes
(A10) lt   lt 1   (1    )(lt ∗   lt 1)   εt 1.
Rearranging terms we get


































    c    yt    wt.
Rearranging terms, we get
(A13) lt   (1    )c    (1    )yt   (1    ) wt    lt 1   εt.
We now suppose ﬁrms have rational expectations and lt
e satisfying the fol-
lowing condition:
(A14) lt
e   (1    )lt    le
t 1,
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Table 4B.2 Case without Increases in Health and Pension Contributions (%)
Total Employment Unskilled Employment Skilled Employment
1993:2 0.1 0.0 0.1
1993:3 0.1 0.5 0.4
1993:4 0.1 0.6 0.4
1994:1 0.1 0.4 0.5
1994:2 0.2 0.1 0.3
1994:3 0.2 0.1 0.3
1994:4 0.7 0.2 0.9
1995:1 0.6 0.8 1.1
1995:2 0.7 0.8 1.1
1995:3 1.2 0.6 1.7
1995:4 1.1 1.0 1.6
1996:1 1.2 1.9 2.2
1996:2 1.3 1.4 2.0
1996:3 1.4 1.0 1.9
1996:4 1.3 1.8 2.2
Source: Authors’ calculations.
Table 4B.3 Case with Elimination of 9 Percent Payroll Taxes (%)
Total Employment Unskilled Employment Skilled Employment
1993:2 0.2 0.2 0.5
1993:3 1.0 0.6 1.0
1993:4 0.7 1.2 0.7
1994:1 1.2 1.4 1.4
1994:2 1.2 1.3 0.9
1994:3 1.3 1.8 1.5
1994:4 1.2 1.1 1.1
1995:1 1.3 1.8 1.5
1995:2 1.2 1.9 1.3
1995:3 1.3 0.9 0.8
1995:4 1.3 1.4 1.4
1996:1 1.2 2.0 1.1
1996:2 1.2 1.4 0.7
1996:3 1.3 0.9 0.6
1996:4 1.3 1.8 0.9
Source: Authors’ calculations.















where L is the lag operator. Then (A13) can be rewritten as
(A16) lt   (1    )c    yt      yt 1    wt      wt 1
   lt 1    2lt 2   εt    εt 1,
which is the estimated equation.
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